Does partial privatization improve the environment? by Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha
WP-2010-018
  Does partial privatization improve the environment?
Rupayan Pal and Bibhas Saha
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai
September 2010
 http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2010-018.pdfDoes partial privatization improve the environment?
Rupayan Pal and Bibhas Saha
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR)
General Arun Kumar Vaidya Marg
 Goregaon (E), Mumbai- 400065, INDIA
Email (corresponding author):  rupayan@igidr.ac.in
Abstract
This  paper  shows  that,  in  case  of  differentiated  products  mixed  duopoly,  environmental  damage
increases (decreases) with the level of privatization, if the level of privatization is less (more) than
certain level. It also shows that partial privatization is optimal from the social welfare point of view.
However, the social welfare maximizing level of privatization damages the environment most. 
Keywords:
Privatization, mixed duopoly, environmental damage, environmental tax, social welfare
JEL Code:
H23, Q50, Q58, L13
Acknowledgements:
Bibhas Saha (b.saha@uea.ac.uk) is with School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK.
iDoes partial privatization improve the environment?
Rupayan Pal† and Bibhas Saha ‡
† Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), India
‡ School of Economics, University of East Anglia, England
1 Introduction
Partial privatization of state-owned enterprises has been a feature of government policy in
many developing as well as developed countries since 1980’s (Megginson and Netter, 2001;
Maw, 2002). It has spread across several sectors such as iron and steel, chemicals, electric-
ity, textile, mining, transport and printing. Nevertheless, these (partially) privatized ﬁrms
compete with other private ﬁrms in product markets.
It is commonly observed that production process in most of the above mentioned indus-
tries emit pollutants, which damages the environment. The extent of such environmental
damage is likely to depend on the intensity of product market competition, which is largely
guided by the ﬁrms’ objective functions. It implies that privatization can also generate
environmental outcomes.
Determination of optimal environmental policy in the context of oligopolistic industries
has received considerable attention in the literature. It helps us to understand a variety
of issues: role of product diﬀerentiation and free entry (Canton et al., 2008; Fujiwara,
2009), consequences of asymmetric information (Antelo and Loureiro, 2009), implications
of strategic managerial delegation (Pal, 2009; Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon, 2002) link be-
tween pollution taxes and ﬁnancial decisions of ﬁrms (Damania, 2000), strategic choice
of environmental policy in case of open economies (Conrad, 1993; Kennedy, 1994; Bar-
rett, 1994; Ulph, 1996; Bhattacharya and Pal, 2010), so on so forth. But, the issue of
privatization has not received much attention in this strand of literature. How does the
environmental damage due to pollution vary with the level of privatization? Is there any
2relation between the level of privatization and environmental taxes? What should be the
optimal level of privatization when production process damages the environment? This
paper attempts to answer these questions by considering a diﬀerentiated products mixed
duopoly market structure.
We note that several studies have attempted to examine the implications of strategic
interactions between public (partially privatized) and private ﬁrms to economic welfare
(see, for example, deFraja and Delbono, 1989; Fershtman, 1990; Matsumura, 1998; Fuji-
wara, 2007; Saha, 2009; Pal, 2010). It is shown that partial privatization is socially optimal,
unless products are perfect substitutes and ﬁrms have constant marginal costs of produc-
tion. However, these studies ignore the consequences of privatization on environment.
Recently, Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006) and Wang and Wang (2009) examine the
eﬀects of privatization on environmental outcomes, by comparing equilibrium outcomes
under full privatization with that under full nationalization. Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon
(2006) consider that products are perfect substitutes, whereas Wang and Wang (2009)
allow for product diﬀerentiation. However, none of these two papers recognize the possibil-
ity of partial privatization and, thus, fails to analyse how the level of privatization aﬀects
environmental outcomes.
Considering a monopoly ﬁrm, Beladi and Chao (2006) show that, if the market de-
mand function is not suﬃciently convex, production decreases due to increase in level of
privatization. Therefore, it is argued that privatization can result in better environment
unless the market demand function is highly convex. But, they ignore the fact that ﬁrms
undertake pollution abatement measures, which is likely to depend on environmental tax
and, thus, on level of privatization. It implies that the results of Beladi and Chao (2006)
may not hold true in a general setup that takes care of pollution abatement decisions of
ﬁrms. Analysing the interaction between environmental policy and privatization in case
international homogenous product duopoly, Ohori (2006) shows that privatization ad-
versely aﬀects environment, as it increases production, and partial privatization is socially
optimum. The present paper diﬀers from Ohori (2006) in three important dimensions:
(a) unlike Ohori (2006), this paper considers asymmetric duopoly; (b) the framework of
3this paper allows for product diﬀerentiation; and (c) while Ohori (2006) considers an open
economy, this paper is restricted to a closed economy.
This paper shows that environmental damage ﬁrst increases with the increase in level
of privatization up to a point, thereafter it starts declining with the increase in level of
privatization. This result is contrast to the ﬁndings of Beladi and Chao (2006) and Ohori
(2006). The intuition behind this result is as follows. Increase in level of privatization
leads to (a) decrease in total production of the industry and, thus, lower emission of
pollutants (direct eﬀect) and (b) lower environmental tax, which induces ﬁrms to produce
more and abate less (indirect eﬀects). Though the combined impact of direct and indirect
eﬀects of privatization on output is negative, the indirect eﬀect of privatization on pollution
abatement dominates the combined impact unless the level of privatization is greater than a
critical level. This paper also shows that partial privatization is socially optimal. However,
environmental damage due to production related pollution is highest at the the socially
optimal level of privatization.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section explains the model. It
also contains the results of the analysis. Section 3 concludes.
2 The model
Let us consider an economy with an oligopolistic sector, consisting of two ﬁrms - ﬁrm 1
and ﬁrm 2, that produce a diﬀerentiated good and a competitive numeraire sector. Firm 1
is partially privatized and ﬁrm 2 is totally privately owned. The inverse demand function
faced by ﬁrm i (= 1,2) is assumed to be linear such that the market price is given by
pi = A − qi − γq j, i, j =1 , 2,i￿= j; where qi (pi) is the quantity (price) of the product
of ﬁrm i and γ (0 <γ<1) is the product diﬀerentiation parameter.1 Lower value of
γ denotes higher degree of product diﬀerentiation, i.e., lower degree of substitutability




m, where m is the quantity of the numeraire good. This speciﬁcation of the representative consumer’s
utility function is similar to that of Singh and Vives (1984).
4between products. We assume, for convenience, that both ﬁrms have identical marginal
cost of production c, which is constant, and that there is no ﬁxed cost of production.2
Production process in both ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 pollutes the environment. We assume, for
simplicity, that production of each unit of output emits one unit of pollutant. However,
each ﬁrm can reduce pollution by undertaking abatement measures. As in Ulph (1996),
the cost of pollution abatement of ﬁrm i is given by Ci =
a2
i
2 , where ai (≥ 0) denotes the
abatement level chosen by ﬁrm i. Thus, the emission level of each ﬁrm is (qi −ai) and the




d(q1 − a1 + q2 − a2)
2, (1)
where d is the increment in marginal environmental damage due to pollution, which is
assumed to be greater than 1
6+2γ.3
The government imposes environmental tax t (0 ≤ t<A− c), on each ﬁrm, per unit
of pollution emitted.4 As a result, total tax revenue collected by the government is
T = t(q1 − a1 + q2 − a2). (2)
The objective of the government is to maximize social welfare, which is given by









2 +2 γq1q2) (4)
and





2Qualitative results of this paper go through, if we consider increasing marginal costs of production.
3This form of environmental damage function is widely considered in the literature (see, for example,
Antelo and Loureiro (2009), Long and Soubeyran (2005) and Ulph (1996)).
d> 1
6+2γ ensures that the optimal environmental tax rate is positive, irrespective of the level of priva-
tization
4Since emission subsidy is not politically viable, we restrict our focus to non-negative emission tax.
5represent consumer surplus and proﬁt, respectively, of ﬁrm i.
Other than deciding the rate of environmental tax t, the government also decides the
level of privatization θ ∈ [0, 1] of ﬁrm 1. Following Matsumura (1998), the private sector
owns a share θ of the partially privatized ﬁrm, ﬁrm 1. Clearly, higher value of θ denotes
higher level of privatization and θ =1( θ = 0) corresponds to the case of full privatization
(full nationalization) of ﬁrm 1.
We consider that a fully privatized ﬁrm maximizes its own proﬁt, whereas a fully
nationalised ﬁrm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. The level
of privatization (θ) determines the bargaining power of the private partner in bargaining
over the payoﬀ with the public sector.5 Note that existing institutional factors of the
economy play crucial roles in determining objective functions of fully nationalised ﬁrms as
well as of partially privatised ﬁrms. Without any loss of generality, the objective function of
ﬁrm 1 can be considered as the weighted average of its own proﬁt and the sum of consumer
surplus and producer surplus, O1 = θπ1 +(1−θ)[CS+π1 +π2]. 6 Thus, ﬁrm 1 chooses its
output q1 and pollution abatement level a1 to maximize O1, and ﬁrm 2 chooses its output
q2 and abatement level a2 to maximize its own proﬁt π2. The stages of the game involved
are as follows.
Stage 1: The government decides the level of privatization (θ).
Stage 2: The government chooses the environmental tax rate (t)
Stage 3: Each ﬁrm simultaneously and independently decides the quantity
(qi) and the level of abatement (ai).
5Alternatively, following Fershtman (1990), if we consider that the private partner and the public
sector bargain over the quantity of output to be produced, where bargaining powers are determined by
respective share holdings, qualitative results of this analysis go through. The reason is the formulations of
Fershtman (1990) and Matsumura (1998) lead to comparable objective functions of the partially privatized
ﬁrm (Kumar and Saha, 2008; Saha, 2009)
6Qualitative results of this analysis go through, if we consider the objective function of ﬁrm 1 as the
(a) weighted average of its own proﬁt and the sum of market speciﬁc consumer surplus and its own proﬁt,
as in Saha (2009); or (b) weighted average of its own proﬁt and the sum of consumer surplus and its own
proﬁt, as in Wang and Wang (2009).
6We solve this game by backward induction method. In stage 3, given the level of
privatization and the rate of environmental tax, ﬁrms’ optimum choice of outputs and
abatement levels are as follows.
q1 =
(A − c − t) (2 − γ)
2 (1 + θ) − γ2 ,
q2 =
(A − c − t) (1 − γ + θ)
2 (1 + θ) − γ2 , (6)
and a1 = a2 = t.
Clearly, both ﬁrms abate pollution up to the point where marginal abatement cost
equals the environmental tax rate. Also, it is easy to check that the partially privatized ﬁrm
produces more than the private ﬁrm, since the private ﬁrm is purely proﬁt oriented whereas
the partially privatized ﬁrm cares about total economic surplus also, i.e, the partially
privatized ﬁrm is more output oriented than the private ﬁrm. Higher output orientation of





That is, increase in environmental tax rate leads to larger reduction in output of the
partially privatized ﬁrm than that of the private ﬁrm. Firms’ optimum choices in stage 3
also indicate that an increase in level of privatization leads to decrease (increase) in output
of the partially privatized ﬁrm (private ﬁrm):
∂q1
∂θ < 0 <
∂q2
∂θ .8 The intuition is higher level
of privatization makes the partially privatized ﬁrm less aggressive in the product market,
which results in shift of production from the partially privatized ﬁrm to the private ﬁrm.
However, overall output of the industry decreases with the increase in level of privatization.9
Therefore, given the environmental tax rate, higher level of privatization leads to lower
emission of pollutants and, thus, lower environmental damage. On the other hand, given
the level of privatization, an increase in environmental tax rate leads to lower outputs
as well as higher abatements, which also result in lower emission of pollutants and lower
environmental damage. It indicates that level of privatization and environmental tax are
substitutes in nature from environmental point of view.






















7maximize social welfare (SW), considering the level of privatization as given.10 Substituting
the optimum choices of qi and ai (i =1 ,2), made by ﬁrms in stage 3, in the expression of
social welfare and solving the problem Max
t SW(t; θ), we get
t =
(A − c)[d(3 − 2γ + θ){7 − 2γ (1 + γ)+5 θ} + γ (2 + 6θ) − γ2 (1 + θ) − θ(6 + θ) − 1]
13 + 2γ3 +2 γ4 − 2γ (1 − θ)+9 θ(2 + θ) − 2γ2 (6 + 5θ)+d{7 − 2γ (1 + γ)+5 θ}
2 = t(θ). (7)
It is straightforward to check that, for any given level of privatization, the optimum en-
vironmental tax rate is less than marginal environmental damage due to pollution, unless
products are perfect substitutes (γ = 1) and ﬁrm 1 is fully nationalized (θ = 0).11 In other
words, in case of diﬀerentiated products duopoly market structure, the optimal environ-
mental tax rate is less than the standard Pigouvian environmental tax rate. This is true
even if one of the ﬁrms is fully nationalized. In other words, the optimal environmental tax
rate is less than the standard Pigouvian tax rate irrespective of the level of privatization, if
products are diﬀerentiated. The underlying reason is, unlike as in case of monopoly, under
diﬀerentiated products duopoly market structure full nationalization of one ﬁrm does not
mitigate the problem of under production due to imperfect competition completely.
Moreover, it is easy to check that the optimum environmental tax rate (t) decreases at
a decreasing rate due to increase in level of privatization (θ): ∂t
∂θ < 0, ∂2t
∂θ2 > 0. Therefore,
it is evident that privatization has two eﬀects on environmental damage: (a) privatization
reduces environmental damage by reducing the overall industrial production (direct eﬀect)
and (b) it calls for lower environmental tax, to take account for the economic surplus,
which in turn increases environmental damage by encouraging higher production and lower
abatement by ﬁrms (indirect eﬀects). If the indirect eﬀects together dominates the direct
eﬀect, privatization will adversely aﬀect the environment.
Now, for any given level of privatization, environmental damage due to pollution is
ED(θ)=1
2d{q1(θ)+q2(θ) − 2t(θ)}2, since a1(θ)=a2(θ)=t(θ); where qi(θ) and ai(θ) are
10Results of this paper are not sensitive to sequential decision making of the government.











13+2γ3+2γ4−2γ (1−θ)+9θ (2+θ)−2γ2 (6+5θ)+d(7−2γ (1+γ)+5θ)2 < 0 ∀θ ∈ [0,1], since
0 <γ<1. t = ∂ED
∂(q1−a1+q2−a2) only if γ = 1 and θ = 0.
8obtained by substituting t(θ) in (6).12 We observe that, if θ<
1+γ−2γ2
9−7γ = θ∗ (0 <θ ∗ < 1,
since 0 <γ<1),
∂ED(θ)
∂θ > 0. Alternatively, if θ ≥ θ∗,
∂ED(θ)
∂θ ≤ 0. That is, environmental
damage due to pollution increases (decreases) with the increase in level of privatization,
unless privatization is greater (less) than the critical level θ∗. Also, note that environmental
damage is maximum at θ = θ∗.13 The underlying reason is as follows. When the level of
privatization is relatively less (θ<θ ∗), increase in level of privatization decreases overall
production, but environmental tax rate and, thus, pollution abatement by ﬁrms decreases





∂θ |). As a result, higher level of privatization leads
to higher pollution and higher environmental damage. The converse is true, if the level of
privatization is more than a critical level. Alternatively, we can say that the indirect eﬀect
of privatization on environmental damage dominates its direct eﬀect, unless the level of
privatization is more than a critical level. These are interesting ﬁndings.
Proposition 1: In case of diﬀerentiated products mixed duopoly, environmental dam-
age can be non-monotone in level of privatization (θ). Increase in level of privatization
adversely aﬀects the environment, if θ<
1+γ−2γ2
9−7γ = θ∗ (0 <θ ∗ < 1). Otherwise, if
θ>θ ∗, higher level of privatization leads to lower environmental damage. In other words,
environmental damage is maximum at θ∗ level of privatization.
The above proposition is in contrast to Beladi and Chao (2006). Note that in case of
monopoly ﬁrm, the direct eﬀect of privatization on output has only one component, which
is negative, since there is no rival ﬁrm. In addition, if the demand function is not highly
convex, that negative direct eﬀect outweighs the positive indirect eﬀect of privatization
on output via environmental tax when there is only one ﬁrm (Beladi and Chao, 2006).
Clearly, if abatement measures undertaken by ﬁrm(s) is ignored, as in Beladi and Chao
(2006), privatization will lead to better environment in case of linear or concave market
12q1(θ)=
(A−c)(1+2d)(−2+γ)(−7+2γ (1+γ)−5θ)
13+2γ3+2γ4+2γ (−1+θ)+9θ (2+θ)−2γ2 (6+5θ)+d(7−2γ (1+γ)+5θ)2 and
q2(θ)=
(A−c)(1+2d)(−7+2γ (1+γ)−5θ)(−1+γ−θ)
13+2γ3+2γ4+2γ (−1+θ)+9θ (2+θ)−2γ2 (6+5θ)+d(7−2γ (1+γ)+5θ)2
13 ∂ED(θ)




9demand functions. Nonetheless, ‘ﬁrms do not undertake any pollution abatement measure,
even when government imposes environmental tax’ is a very strong assumption. Since it is
optimal for ﬁrms to undertake abatement measure(s), there is an additional component of
indirect eﬀect of privatization on pollution emission, which is the eﬀect of privatization on
pollution abatement via its impact on environmental tax rate. This second order indirect
eﬀect plays a crucial role in determining the impact of privatization on environmental
damage.
Next, we turn to stage 1 of the game, where the government decides the level of pri-
vatization to maximize social welfare, by correctly anticipating its impacts on optimal
environmental tax rate and ﬁrms’ behaviour. The problem of the government in stage 1
can be written as, Max
θ
SW(θ), where SW(θ) is obtained by substituting t(θ), qi(θ) and
ai(θ) in the expression of SW. Solving this problem we get the social welfare maximizing





Clearly, 0 <θ pp < 1, since 0 <γ<1. It implies that partial privatization is socially
optimal. This result is in line with the existing literature on privatization in case of
diﬀerentiated products oligopoly (see, for example, Saha (2009) and Fujiwara (2007)).
To illustrate it further, note that a fully nationalized ﬁrm sets the price at marginal cost.
Privatization induces it to be less aggressive in the product market and to increase its
price above the marginal cost. As a result, private ﬁrm’s output increases at the expense
of public ﬁrm’s output leading to fall in total output. Thus, privatization adversely aﬀects
consumer surplus, but it leads to higher industry proﬁt. Moreover, consumer surplus
(industry proﬁt) decreases (increases) at an increasing (decreasing) rate with the increase
in level of privatization. Initially, if products are diﬀerentiated, gain due to increased
industry proﬁt is more than the loss due to lower consumers surplus. Therefore, in case of
diﬀerentiated products mixed duopoly, partial privatization is optimal.14 Environmental
14In case of homogeneous product mixed duopoly/oligopoly also partial privatization is socially optimal,
provided that there is increasing marginal cost of production (see Matsumura (1998)).
10pollution due to production, together with environmental tax and pollution abatement by
ﬁrms, adds another dimension to it, as discussed before. We now summarize the equilibrium
outcomes in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: In equilibrium, level of privatization, environmental tax rate, environ-























−9+7γ2 +4d2 (−17 + 7γ (1 + γ)) + 2d (−26 + 7γ (1 + 2γ))
￿




2 (1 + 2d)




2H2 [19 + γ (2 − 7 (7 − 4γ) γ)+4d2 (67 − 2γ (40 + 7 (1 − 2γ) γ))
+4d (1 − γ){11 + 28(γ − γ2)}],
π2,pp =
(A − c)2
2H2 [4d (43 − 44γ) (1 − γ) + 51(1 − γ)
2 +4d2 (99 − 2 (92 − 43γ) γ)],
q1,pp =




5( A − c) (1 + 2d) (1 − γ)
H
, where H =9− 7γ2 +2d (17 − 7γ (1 + γ)).
The subscript pp denotes partial privatization.
Note that, the government imposes environmental tax, if pollution damages the en-
vironment beyond a certain level. It is easy to check that, in the present scenario, the
optimal environmental tax (tpp) is positive, if the rate of marginal environmental damage
(d) is suﬃciently high: tpp > 0, if d>
1−γ
14−12γ, which is true by assumption.
From Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, we ﬁnd that socially optimal level of privatization
harms the environment most, since θpp = θ∗. If θ<θ ∗, increase in privatization damages
the environment more whereas economic welfare increases with privatization. The reverse
11is true for θ>θ ∗. Clearly, eﬀects of privatization on economic welfare and environment
are in opposite directions, where the former dominates the latter.
Proposition 2: (a) Partial privatization is optimal from the social welfare point of
view. (b) Socially optimal level of privatization damages the environment most.
3 Conclusion
This paper analyses the impact of privatization on environment, where level of privati-
zation is endogenously determined. Considering a diﬀerentiated products mixed duopoly
market structure, it shows that environmental damage increases with the increase in level
of privatization up to a point, thereafter increase in level of privatization reduces envi-
ronmental damage. It also shows that partial privatization is socially optimal. However,
socially optimal level of privatization damages the environment most.
Clearly, there is a conﬂict of interests between the ‘green lobby’ and the ‘economic
welfare lobby’ as far as privatization is concerned. In the present analysis it is implicitly
assumed that the strength of the ‘green lobby’ is limited in the sense that environmental
damage does not receive higher importance than economic welfare in the government’s ob-
jective function. Environmental awareness of citizens and institutional factors are likely to
play crucial roles in determining the relative strengths of the parties involved. It seems to
be useful to extend this paper to a more general framework that allows for endogenous de-
termination of the government’s objective function through bargaining between the ‘green
lobby’ and the ‘economic welfare lobby’. While this is beyond the scope of this paper,
one may though suspect that the qualitative results of this paper would hold unless the
strength of the ‘green lobby’ is suﬃciently higher than that of ‘economic welfare lobby’. It
might also be interesting to extend the present analysis by considering consumption related
pollution.
12References
Antelo, M. and Loureiro, M. L. (2009). Asymmetric information, signaling and environ-
mental taxes in oligopoly. Ecological Economics, 68(5):1430–1440.
Barcena-Ruiz, J. C. and Garzon, M. B. (2002). Environmental taxes and strategic delega-
tion. Spanish Economic Review, 4(4):301–310.
Barcena-Ruiz, J. C. and Garzon, M. B. (2006). Mixed oligopoly and environmental policy.
Spanish Economic Review, 8(2):139–160.
Barrett, S. (1994). Strategic environmental policy and international trade. Journal of
Public Economics, 54(3):325–338.
Beladi, H. and Chao, C.-C. (2006). Does privatization improve the environment? Eco-
nomics Letters, 93(3):343–347.
Bhattacharya, R. N. and Pal, R. (2010). Environmental standards as strategic outcomes:
A simple model. Resource and Energy Economics, 32(3):408–420.
Canton, J., Stahn, H., and Soubeyran, A. (2008). Environmental Taxation and Vertical
Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter. Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics, 40(3):369–382.
Conrad, K. (1993). Taxes and subsidies for pollution-intensive industries as trade policy.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 25(2):121–135.
Damania, R. (2000). Financial structure and the eﬀectiveness of pollution control in an
oligopolistic industry. Resource and Energy Economics, 22(1):21–36.
deFraja, G. and Delbono, F. (1989). Alternative strategies of a public enterprise in
oligopoly. Oxford Economic Papers, 41(2):302–11.
Fershtman, C. (1990). The interdependence between ownership status and market struc-
ture: The case of privatization. Economica, 57(227):319–28.
13Fujiwara, K. (2007). Partial privatization in a diﬀerentiated mixed oligopoly. Journal of
Economics, 92(1):51–65.
Fujiwara, K. (2009). Environmental policies in a diﬀerentiated oligopoly revisited. Resource
and Energy Economics, 31(3):239–247.
Kennedy, P. W. (1994). Equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect
competition. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 27(1):49–63.
Kumar, A. and Saha, B. (2008). Spatial competition in a mixed duopoly with one partially
nationalized ﬁrm. Journal of Comparative Economics, 36(2):326–341.
Long, V. N. and Soubeyran, A. (2005). Selective penalization of polluters: an inf-
convolution approach. Economic Theory, 25(2):421–454.
Matsumura, T. (1998). Partial privatization in mixed duopoly. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 70(3):473–483.
Maw, J. (2002). Partial privatization in transition economies. Economic Systems,
26(3):271–282.
Megginson, W. L. and Netter, J. M. (2001). From state to market: A survey of empirical
studies on privatization. Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2):321–389.
Ohori, S. (2006). Optimal environmental tax and level of privatization in an international
duopoly. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 29(2):225–233.
Pal, R. (2009). Delegation and Emission Tax in a Diﬀerentiated Oligopoly. IGIDR-WP-
2009-007, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, India.
Pal, R. (2010). How much should you own? Cross-ownership and privatization. IGIDR-
WP-2010-015, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, India.
Saha, B. (2009). Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with diﬀerentiated products. Journal
of Economics, 98(1):25–43.
14Singh, N. and Vives, X. (1984). Price and quantity competition in a diﬀerentiatedduopoly.
Rand Journal of Economics, 15:546–554.
Ulph, A. (1996). Environmental policy and international trade when governments and
producers act strategically. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
30(3):265–281.
Wang, L. F. and Wang, J. (2009). Environmental taxes in a diﬀerentiated mixed duopoly.
Economic Systems, 33(4):389–396.
15